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ABSTRACT 
 
Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory 
and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein to 
be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human life, but behavior is 
largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed 
in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is 
critical to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality 
(LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT). 
After summarizing the framework worked out by Wittgenstein and Searle, as 
extended by modern reasoning research, I show the inadequacies in Carruther’s 
views, which pervade most discussions of behavior, including contemporary 
behavioral sciences. I maintain that his book is an amalgam of two books, one a 
summary of cognitive psychology and the other a summary of the standard 
philosophical confusions on the mind with some new jargon added. I suggest that 
the latter should be regarded as incoherent or as a cartoon view of life and that 
taking Wittgenstein at his word, we can practice successful self therapy by 
regarding the mind/body issue as a language/body issue. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
I will first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary 
psychological research as exemplified in the works of John Searle (S) and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (W) (jointly WS) as I consider S the successor to W and one must study 
their work together. It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New 
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Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and 
about these two geniuses, who provide a clear description of behavior that I will 
refer to as the WS framework. Given this framework, which Searle calls the Logical 
Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order 
Thought (DPHOT), it is possible to have clear descriptions of behavior, but it is 
entirely missing from nearly all such discussions. 
 
Even in the works of WS it is not laid out clearly and in virtually all others it is only 
hinted at, with the usual disastrous consequences. I will begin with some quotes 
from W and S. These quotes are not chosen at random but result from a decade of 
study and together they are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two 
greatest descriptive psychologists. If one understands them, they penetrate as 
deeply as it is possible to go into the mind (largely coextensive with language as W 
made clear) and provide as much guidance as one needs—it is then just a matter of 
looking at how language works in each case and by far the best place to find 
perspicuously analyzed examples of language is in the 20,000 pages of 
Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 
"young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its 
beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For 
in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the 
other case, conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) The existence of the 
experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems 
that trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI 
p.232) 
 
“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the 
real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.”  
Wittgenstein The Blue Book 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding the 
solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. ---Not anything that 
follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is connected, I believe, with 
our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the solution of the difficulty is a 
description, if we give it the right place in our considerations. If we dwell upon it, 
and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel p312-314 
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"The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very 
one we thought quite innocent." Wittgenstein, PI para.308 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor 
do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited 
background against which I distinguish between true and false."Wittgenstein OC 
94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the 
activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply 
describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to 
remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces 
anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not 
curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has doubted and 
which have only gone unremarked because they are always before our eyes." 
Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway."Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 
corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the 
sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the problem of philosophy)." 
Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
 
"Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in virtue 
of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and independently of the 
agent's desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ... The real paradox of the 
traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume's guillotine, the rigid fact- value 
distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which already presupposes the falsity of the 
distinction." Searle PNC p165-171 
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"...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of 
language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations...the 
forms of the status function in question are almost invariably matters of deontic 
powers...to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so on 
is to recognize a reason for action...these deontic structures make possible desire-
independent reasons for action...The general point is very clear: the creation of the 
general field of desire-based reasons for action presupposed the acceptance of a 
system of desire-independent reasons for action." Searle PNC p34-49 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach 
of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... 
Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously 
experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC 
p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with 
conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an 
intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always 
determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything 
sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns out that all intentionality 
is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"So, status functions are the glue that hold society together. They are created by 
collective intentionality and they function by carrying deontic powers...With the 
important exception of language itself, all of institutional reality and therefor in a 
sense all of human civilization is created by speech acts that have the logical form 
of Declarations...all of human institutional reality is created and maintained in 
existence by (representations that havethe same logical form as) Status Function 
Declarations, including the cases that are not speech acts in the explicit form of 
Declarations." Searle MSW p11-13 
 
"But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by 
identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because the 
existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually works as a 
physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no further 
causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide causal explanations of 
cognition... There is just a physical mechanism, the brain, with its various real 
physical and physical/mental causal levels of description." Searle Philosophy in a 
New Century (PNC) p101-103 
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"In short, the sense of `information processing' that is used in cognitive science is at 
much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological reality of 
intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this difference by the fact that the same 
sentence `I see a car coming toward me,' can be used to record both the visual 
intentionality and the output of the computational model of vision...in the sense of 
`information' used in cognitive science, it is simply false to say that the brain is an 
information processing device." Searle PNC p104-105 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people erroneously 
suppose that every mental representation must be consciously thought...but the 
notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and not an ontological 
notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that can succeed or fail in a way 
that is characteristic of intentionality, is by definition a representation of its 
conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze the structure of the intentionality of 
social phenomena by analyzing their conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28-
32 
 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction. The capacity to do this is a crucial element of human cognitive 
capacities. It requires the ability to think on two levels at once, in a way that is 
essential for the use of language. At one level, the speaker intentionally produces a 
physical utterance, but at another level the utterance represents something. And the 
same duality infects the symbol itself. At one level, it is a physical object like any 
other. At another level, it has a meaning: it represents a type of a state of affairs" 
MSW p74" 
 
...once you have language, it is inevitable that you will have deontology because 
there is no way you can make explicit speech acts performed according to the 
conventions of a language without creating commitments. This is true not just for 
statements but for all speech acts" MSW p82 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, 
not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 thinking 
(e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions), but the logical extensions 
of S2 into culture (S3). 
 6 
 
 
Searle's (S) work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order S2/S3 
social behavior which is due to the recent evolution of genes for dispositional 
psychology, while the later Wittgenstein (W) shows how it is based on true-only 
unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional 
thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, 
mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, mental states- our perceptions and 
memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and UA1 --Understanding 
of Agency 1-- and Emotions 1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described 
causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic functions are expressions or 
descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, testable 
true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, 
hating-- the dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, 
intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms 
of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of 
neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W for many 
examples and Searle and Hacker ( 3 volumes on Human Nature)for disquisitions). 
 
One should take seriously W's comment that even if God could look into our mind 
he could not see what we are thinking--this should be the motto of Cognitive 
Psychology. Yes, a cognitive psychologist of the future may be able to see what we 
are perceiving and remembering and our reflexive thinking and acting, since these 
S1 functions are always causal mental states (CMS) but S2 dispositions are only 
potentially CMS and so not realized or visible. This is not a theory but description 
of our language, mind, life, grammar (W). S, Carruthers (C) and others muddy the 
waters here because they sometimes refer to dispositions as mental states as well, 
but as W did long ago, S, Hacker and others show that the language of causality just 
does not apply to the higher order emergent S2 descriptions-- again not a theory 
but a description of how our dispositional states (language, thinking) work. 
 
S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non-propositional, 
true only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be described in terms of 
reasons for actions that are more or less conscious dispositions to behavior 
(potential actions) that are or can become propositional (T or F). It seems quite 
obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists for the same 
reason as nearly all behavior--it is the default operation of our evolved psychology 
(EP) which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think through 
slowly (S2), rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious-
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-called by S in PNC `The Phenomenological Illusion' (TPI). TPI is not a harmless 
philosophical error but a universal obliviousness to our biology which produces the 
illusion that we control our life and among the consequences are the inexorable 
collapse of what passes for civilization. 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W characterized 
as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or possible actions, are not 
mental states (or not in the same sense as S1 states), and do not have any definite 
time of occurrence and/or duration. But disposition words like "knowing", 
"understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W discussed extensively, have at 
least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use (but graduating into 
everyday uses) which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct 
perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these 
are my hands')--i.e., they are Causally Self Referential (CSR)—i.e., to see a cat makes 
it true and in the normal case no test is possible, and the S2 use, which is their 
normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, and which can become true or 
false (`I know my way home')--i.e., they have external, public, testable Conditions 
of Satisfaction (COS) and are not CSR. 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking of System 1 has revolutionized 
psychology, economics and other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", 
"priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too are language 
games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies 
and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm 
as W made clear), but presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking 
only, since any System 2 thought or intentional action cannot occur without 
involving much of the intricate network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", 
"intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or 
"bedrock" --as W and later Searle call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates the 
higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat muscle 
contractions which inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, which 
commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over prelinguistic or protolinguistic 
interactions in which only gross muscle movements were able to convey very 
limited information about intentions. 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 producing 
the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during personal 
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development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural deontic relationships 
(S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure of behavior. 
 
These descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1 of MSW, 
which Searle has used for many years and is the basis for an extended one I have 
created. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to modern psychological 
research by using my S1, S2, S3 terminology and W's true-only vs propositional 
(dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-only perception, memory 
and prior intention (cause originates in the world), while S2 refers to propositional 
(true or false testable) dispositions such as belief and desire (cause originates in the 
mind). 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless 
(lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly 
causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and Myin's `Radical 
Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from MSW p39 beginning "In sum" 
and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') are 
caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via prior 
intentions and intentions-in-action, we try to match how we desire things to be with 
how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire (and imagination--desires 
time shifted and decoupled from intention) and other S2 propositional dispositions 
of our slow thinking later evolved second self, are totally dependent upon (have 
their COS originating in) the CSR rapid automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. 
In language and neurophysiology there are intermediate or blended cases such as 
intending (prior intentions) or remembering, where the causal connection with COS 
(i.e., with S1) is time shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which 
is always in the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated 
seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal 
experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast arena of 
cognitive illusions that dominate our life Searle has described as `The 
Phenomenological Illusion.' 
 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that `will', 
`self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 just like 
seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of demonstrating (of 
giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so wonderfully clear numerous times, 
they are the basis for judgment and so cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of 
 9 
 
our psychology are not evidential. 
Like Carruthers and others, Searle sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 (i.e., 
memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) structure. As 
I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems crystal clear that W 
is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that only S2 is propositional 
and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) 
because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were 
propositional in the same sense it would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the 
chaos that was philosophy before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not 
be possible. As W showed countless times and biology demostrates, life must be 
based on certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always 
have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no philosophy. 
 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations of 
vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information transfer than 
contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders of magnitude 
higher for visual information. 
 
Thinking is propositional and so deals with true or false statements, which means 
that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to the true-only 
automatic cognitive functions of S1. Or you can say that spontaneous utterances 
and actions are the primitive reflexes or Primary Language Games (PLG) of S1, 
while conscious representations are the dispositional Secondary Language Games 
(SLG's) of S2. It sounds trivial and indeed it is, but this is the most basic statement 
of how behavior works and hardly anyone has ever understood it. 
 
 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: "We 
yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically include Desire -
Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires displaced in space and time, 
most often for reciprocal altruism), which produce dispositions to behavior that 
commonly result sooner or later in muscle movements that serve our inclusive 
fitness (increased survival for genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I 
would restate his description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The 
resolution of the paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive 
fitness generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal 
immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate reasons of 
DIRA2/3, but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious DIRA1 (the 
ultimate cause). 
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Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid reflexive 
causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow thinking of S2 (often 
modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which produces reasons for action that 
often result in activation of body and/or speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The 
general mechanism is via both neurotransmission and by changes in 
neuromodulators in targeted areas of the brain. The overall cognitive illusion 
(called by S `The Phenomenological Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by 
Tooby and Cosmides `The Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has 
generated the action consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in 
control of, but anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that 
this view is not credible. 
 
Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S notes 
(as quoted above) that there is a general way to characterize the act of meaning-- 
"Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of 
satisfaction" which is an act and not a mental state. This can be seen as another 
statement of W’s argument against private language (personal interpretations vs 
publicly testable ones). Likewise, with rule following and interpretation --they can 
only be publicly checkable acts--no private rules or private interpretations either. 
And one must note that many (most famously Kripke) miss the boat here, being 
misled by W's frequent referrals to community practice into thinking it's just 
arbitrary public practice that underlies language and social conventions. W makes 
clear many times that such conventions are only possible given an innate shared 
psychology which he often calls the background, and it this which underlies all 
behavior and which is schematized in the table. 
 
As I have noted in my other reviews, few if any have fully understood the later W 
and, lacking the S1, S2 framework it is not surprising. Thus, one can understand 
why one cannot imagine an object while seeing it as the domination of S2 by S1. 
There is no test for my inner experiences, so whatever comes to mind when I 
imagine Jack's face is the image of Jack. Similarly, with reading and calculation 
which can refer to S1, S2 or a combination,  and there is the constant temptation to 
apply S2 terms to S1 processes where the lack of any test makes them inapplicable. 
Two of W's famous examples used for combatting this temptation are playing tennis 
without a ball (`S1 tennis'), and a tribe that had only S2 calculation so `calculating 
in the head (`S1 calculating') was not possible. 
 
`Playing' and `calculating' describe actual or potential acts--i.e., they are disposition 
words but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have said before one really ought 
to keep them straight by writing `playing1' and `playing2' etc. But we are not taught 
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to do this and so we want to either dismiss `calculating1' as a fantasy, or we think 
we can leave its nature undecided until later. Hence another of W's famous 
comments--"The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it 
was the very one we thought quite innocent." That is, the first few sentences or often 
the title commit one to a way of looking at things (a language game) which prevents 
clear use of language in the present context. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, and this 
means has public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When I think in 
language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal 
expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought." And, if I think with or 
without words, the thought is whatever I (honestly) say it is as there is no other 
possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It is in language 
that wish and fulfillment meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony 
between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And 
one might note here that `grammar' in W can usually be interpreted as the logical 
structure of language, and that in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing 
and generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of philosophy and higher 
order descriptive psychology as one can find. 
 
Likewise, with the question "What makes it true that my image of Jack is an image 
of him?" Imagining is another disposition and the COS is that the image I have in 
my head is Jack and that's why I will say `YES' if shown his picture and `NO' if 
shown one of someone else. The test here is not that the photo matches the vague 
image I had but that I intended it (had the COS that) to be an image of him. Hence 
the famous quote from W: "If God had looked into our minds he would not have 
been able to see there whom we were speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments that 
the whole problem of representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what gives 
the image its interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence 
W's summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that without 
any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that should happen"..." 
the question whether I know what I wish before my wish is fulfilled cannot arise at 
all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing does not mean that it fulfills it.  
Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it 
were asked `Do I know what I long for before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then 
I do know." 
 
Disposition words refer to Potential Events (PE's) which I accept as fulfilling the 
COS and my mental states, emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on the 
way dispositions function. I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, 
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desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that I express. 
Thinking and intending are S2 dispositions which can only be expressed by 
reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table 
of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over the last 
few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much 
to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by 
current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes which are evidenced in 
the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 
3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing 
behavior that I find more complete and useful than any other framework I have 
seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three 
dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, 
between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W 
demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly 
different uses (meanings or COS). 
 
Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal 
utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). 
Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being 
coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), 
the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the 
Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality 
(LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical 
philosophical term. 
 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and Willing 
(Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s “impose 
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conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate mental states to 
the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his “mind to 
world direction of fit” and “world to mind direction of fit” by “cause originates in 
the mind” and “cause originates in the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world 
to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has 
content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my 
terminology in this table. 
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 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
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Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 
Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/
Word 
Subliminal 
Effects 
No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 
RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/ 
Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General 
Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive 
Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal 
Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
 
* Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible 
actions etc. 
** Searle’s Prior Intentions 
*** Searle’s Intention InAction 
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
******   (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called 
this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
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******** Here and Now or There and Then 
 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of 
language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at 
explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is critical 
to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use 
of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination of context variation 
is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous 
tables and charts that should be compared with this one. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their 
analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019). 
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EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles 
to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events 
(perceptions, memory, reflexive actions that can be described as Primary or 
Primitive Language Games (PLG’s)—i.e., one class of reflexes of the fast associative 
unconscious automated System 1, subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-
referential, intransitive, informationless, true only mental stateswith a precise time 
and location) and gradually developed the further ability to encompass 
displacements in space and time to describe memories, attitudes and potential 
events (the past and future and often counterfactual, conditional or fictional 
preferences, inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated Language 
Games (SLG’s) of System 2 slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, 
transitive (having public COS), representational, true or false propositional 
attitudinal thinking, which has no precise time and are abilities and not mental 
states). Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, 
Behaviors, Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference 
Engines, Inclinations, Emotions, Propositional Attitudes, Appraisals, Capacities, 
Hypotheses. Some Emotions are Type 2 Preferences (W RPP2 148). “I believe”, “he 
loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in 
spacetime. My first-person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) 
while third person statements about others are true or false (see my review of 
Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’). 
 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts 
and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and 
termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed 
“propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a misleading phrase since 
believing, intending, knowing, remembering etc., are often not propositions nor 
attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and 
Language p118). They are intrinsic, observer independent mental representations 
(as opposed to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle- 
C+L p53). 
 
They are potential acts displaced in time or space while the evolutionarily more 
primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are always here and now. 
This is one way to characterize System 2 –the major advance in vertebrate 
psychology after System 1—the ability to represent events and to think of them as 
occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual 
imagination supplementing cognition and volition). S2 dispositions are abilities to 
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act (contract muscles producing speech or body movements via S1 at which time 
they become causal and mental states). Sometimes dispositions may be regarded as 
unconscious since they can become conscious later-Searle - Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described as S1 or 
Primary Language Games’s (PLG’s --e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal 
case, NO TESTS possible so they can be True Only. 
 
Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s (SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) 
and must also be acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what 
I believe, think, feel until I act—see above quotes from W). Dispositions also become 
Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out in other ways, and these 
ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka 
& Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder 
of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique investigation of the functioning 
of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its interaction with System 2. Though 
few have understood it well (and arguably nobody fully to this day) it was further 
developed by a few --above all by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this 
table in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of 
the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first 
comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work On Certainty 
(OC)(written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology 
and ontology (arguably the same), cognitive linguistics or DPHOT, and in my view 
the single most important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus in 
the study of behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Basic Emotions 
are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in 
PLG’s, in which the mind automatically fits the world - S1 is only upwardly causal 
(world to mind direction of fit) and contentless (lacking representations or 
information) (is Causally Self Referential—Searle) --the unquestionable, true only, 
axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is possible). Preferences, 
Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary 
Abilities—that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit the world - 
S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world direction of fit). 
 
Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology 
(philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and describe all actions with 
Secondary Language Games (SLG’s) which S calls The Phenomenological Illusion 
(TPI). W understood this and described itwith unequalled clarity with hundreds of 
examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. Reason has access 
to working memory and so we use consciously apparent but typically incorrect 
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reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves of current research). Beliefs and other 
Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match the facts of the world 
(mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior 
Intentions—PI, and IntentionsIn Action-IA-Searle) plus acts which try to match the 
world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. 
Searle e.g., C+L p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Inclination words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (e.g. 
belief), or as verbs which describe abilities (agents as they act or might act) (e.g., 
believing) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional Attitudes”. 
 
Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, 
templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—(actual or 
potential PUBLIC ACTS also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, 
Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) of 
PRIVATE mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language). 
 
Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology.  
 
PERCEPTIONS: (“X” is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, temperature 
 
MEMORIES: Remembering, Dreaming (S1) 
 
PRFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS (X might become True) (S2) 
 
CLASS 1: Believing, Judging, Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, 
Deciding, Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), 
Attending (Learning), Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, 
Considering, Desiring, expecting, wishing, wanting, hoping (a special class), Seeing 
As (Aspects),  
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-- Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, 
Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. 
Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected 
maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of perceptions and 
memories for rapid action. There is some separation between S1 emotions such as 
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rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. 
 
DESIRES: (I want “X” to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make “X” True) Intending 
 
ACTIONS (I am making “X” True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, 
Calculating, Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, 
Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting(describing, 
teaching, predicting, reporting), Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, 
Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary and transfer 
Information to others so they dominate over the Unconscious, Involuntary and 
Informationless S1 reflexes in explanations of behavior. 
 
ALL WORDS ARE PARTS OF COMPLEX LANGUAGE GAMES (THOUGHTS LEADING TO ACTIONS) HAVING 
VARIOUS FUNCTIONS IN OUR LIFE AND ARE NOT THE NAMES OF OBJECTS NOR OF A SINGLE TYPE OF 
EVENT.  
 
We drive a car but also own it, see it, see its photo, dream about it, imagine it, expect 
it, remember it. The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive 
modules— roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social psychology 
(groups of neurons organized into inference engines), which, with perceptions and 
memories, lead to the formation of preferences which lead to intentions and then to 
actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken to be all these 
processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense is the 
subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including 
neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary psychology can 
be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of the operation of the 
modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, 
development and individual action with preferences, intentions and actions. Since 
the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes, 
we can enlarge our understanding by giving clear descriptions of how they work 
and can extend them (culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive 
psychology), math, logic, physics, and computer programs, thus making them 
faster andmore efficient. Hajek (2003) gives an analysis of dispositions as 
conditional probabilities and they are algorithmatized by Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of 
behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules (however 
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defined) which create and require consciousness, will and self and in normal human 
adults all dispositions are purposive, require public acts (e.g., language), and 
commit us to relationships (called Desire Independent Reasons for Action- DIRA 
by Searle) in order to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum expected utility— 
sometimes called-controversially-Bayesian utility maximization) via dominance 
and reciprocal altruism and impose Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of 
Satisfaction - Searle-(i.e., relate thoughts to the world via public acts - muscle 
movements –i.e., math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc.).  The basics of this were 
figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 
1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 1911 (“The general tree of 
psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of the whole.” 
RPP Vol 1 P895 cf Z P464), and with refinements by many, but above all by John 
Searle beginning in the 1960’s. Much of our S2 intentionality admits of degrees or 
kinds (principally language games). As W noted, inclinations (e.g. thinking) are 
sometimes conscious and deliberative. All our templates (functions, concepts, 
language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as they must to be useful. There 
are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using the 
dispositional verb ‘thinking’)—non-rational without awareness and rational with 
partial awareness (W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and S2. It 
is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W RPP2 
129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are 
epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no 
role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all dispositions 
(inclinations, propositional attitudes) is not a mental state, and contains no 
information until it becomes a public act (realizes a COS) in speech, writing or other 
muscular contractions. Our perceptions and memories can have information 
(meaning-COS) when they are manifested in public actions via S2, for only then do 
they have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become 
psychologically effective when they are acted upon. Developing language means 
manifesting the innate ability to substitute words for acts. The common term TOM 
(Theory of Mind) is much better called (UA-Understanding ofAgency).  
 
Intentionality is the innate genetically programmed production of consciousness, 
self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions by contracting 
muscles. Thus, “propositional attitude” is a confusing term for normal intuitive 
rational or non-rational speech and action but I give it as a synonym for dispositions 
as it’s still widely used by those unfamiliar with W and S. The efforts of 
cognitive science to understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying 
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neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more about how the mind 
(thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain works) than we already 
know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in full public view (W). Any 
phenomena that are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry, genetics, quantum 
mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table 
is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be described by) the laws of physics and 
chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so famously said “Nothing is hidden”. 
Everything of interest about the mind (thought, language) is open to view if we only 
examine carefully the workings of language. 
 
Language was evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of 
resources, survival and reproduction. Its grammar functions automatically and is 
extremely confusing when we try to analyze it. Words and sentences have multiple 
uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different roles as do 
I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The present tense first person 
expressive use of inclinational verbs such as ‘I believe’ describe my ability to predict 
my probable acts and are not descriptive of my mental state nor based on 
knowledge or information in the usual sense of those words (W). “I believe its 
raining”, “I believed it was raining”, “he believes its raining”, “he will believe its 
raining,”, “I believe it will rain” or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially 
verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime that intend to convey information (or 
misinformation) and so have COS which are their truth (or falsity) makers. 
 
Non-reflective or Non-rational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent have 
been called Words as Deeds by W & then by DMS in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000) are typical of much of our behavior as they bridge S1 and S2 
which interact in both directions most of our waking life. 
 
Perceptions, Memories, some Emotions and many “Type 1 Dispositions” are better 
called Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, non-reflective, NON-Propositional and 
NON-Attitudinal functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our 
Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein). 
 
Now for some comments on “The Opacity of Mind” (OM). 
 
By the time I finished the first page of the preface, I realized this book was just 
another hopeless mess (the norm in philosophy). He made it clear that he had no 
grasp of the subtlety of language games (e.g., the drastically different uses of ‘I 
know I’m awake’, ‘I know what I mean’ and ‘I know what time it is’) nor the nature 
of dispositions (which he calls by the misleading and obsolete term ‘propositional 
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attitudes’) and was basing his ideas about behavior on such notions as private 
language, introspection of ‘inner speech’ and the computational description of 
mind, which were laid to rest by W ¾ of a century ago and by S and many others 
since. But I knew most books on human behavior are just as confused and that he 
was going to give a summary of recent scientific work on the brain functions 
corresponding to higher order thought (HOT), so I kept on. 
 
Before I read any book in philosophy or cognitive science, I go to the index and 
bibliography to see whom they cite and then try to find some reviews and especially 
an article in BBS since it has peer feedback, which is generally highly informative. 
As noted above, W and S are two of the most famous names in this field but in the 
index and bibliography I found only 3 trivial mentions of W and not one for S or 
Hacker—surely the most remarkable achievement of this volume. As expected, 
several reviews from philosophical journals were useless and the BBS responses to 
his précis of this book appear devastating--though, characteristically (with the 
exception of one mention of W) -- they too are clueless about WS. More remarkable, 
though he includes many references as recent as 2012, the 2009 BBS article is not 
among them and, so far as I can recall, he does not provide substantive responses 
to its criticisms in this book. Consequently, the powerful WS inspired LSR 
framework is totally absent and all the confusions it has cleared away are abundant 
on nearly every page. If you read the above and my other reviews and then the BBS 
article (readily available free on the net) your view of this book (and most writing 
in this arena) will likely be quite different. Of course, the major defect of BBS is 
apparent--- the commenters get only a one page comment and no reply, while the 
authors get a long article and a long reply, so it always appears that they prevail. It 
is clear however that C’s ISA theory, like most (all?) philosophical theories is a shape 
shifter which alters to “explain” every objection. Thus, the line between a 
meaningful theory (actually a description) tied to facts, and a vague notion that 
“explains” nothing, blurs. Of course, C often says that his theory “predicts” such 
and such observation, but this appears to occur after the fact and of course the 
opposing theories shape shift as well. A powerful theory predicts things which 
nobody was expecting and even the opposite of what they were expecting. We are 
also reminded of W’s constant injunctions to stick to describing the facts and avoid 
otiose “explanations”. 
 
W’s definitive arguments against introspection and private language are noted in 
my other reviews and are extremely well known. Basically, they are as clear as 
day—we must have a test to differentiate between A and B and tests can only be 
external and public. He famously illustrated this with the ‘Beetle in the Box’. If we 
all have a box that cannot be opened nor x-rayed etc. and call what is inside a ‘beetle’ 
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then ‘beetle’ cannot have any role in language, for every box could contain a 
different thing or it could even be empty. So, there is no private language that only 
I can know and no introspection of ‘inner speech’. If X is not publicly demonstrable 
it cannot be a word in our language. This shoots down Carruther’s (C’s) ISA theory 
of mind, as well as all the other ‘inner sense’ theories which he references and a 
huge # of other books and articles. I have explained W’s dismantling of the notion 
of introspection and the functioning of dispositional language (‘propositional 
attitudes’) above and in my reviews of Budd, Johnston and several of S’s books. 
Basically, he showed that the causal relation and word and object model that works 
for S1 does not apply to S2. 
 
Regarding ISA, many have deconstructed the idea of a ‘language of thought’ but in 
my view none better than W in BBB p37 —, “if we keep in mind the possibility of a 
picture which, though correct, has no similarity with its object, the interpolation of 
a shadow between the sentence and reality loses all point. For now, the sentence 
itself can serve as such a shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn’t 
the slightest similarity with what it represents.” 
 
One thing to keep in mind is that philosophical theories have no practical impact 
whatsoever- the real role of philosophy being to clear up confusions about how 
language is being used in particular cases (W). Like various ‘physical theories’ but 
unlike other cartoon views of life (i.e., the standard religious, political, 
psychological, sociological, biological, medical, economic, anthropological and 
historical views of most people), it is too cerebral and esoteric to be grasped by more 
than a tiny fringe and it is so unrealistic that even its adherents totally ignore it in 
their everyday life. Likewise, with other academic ‘theories of life’ such as the 
Standard Social Science or Blank Slate Model widely shared by sociology, 
anthropology, pop psychology, history and literature. However, religions big and 
small, political movements, and sometimes economics often generate or embrace 
already existing cartoons that ignore physics and biology (human nature), posit 
forces terrestrial or cosmic that reinforce our superstitions (our innately inspired 
psychological defaults), and help to lay waste to the earth (the real purpose of nearly 
every social practice and institution which are there to facilitate replication of genes 
and consumption of resources). The point is to realize that these are on a continuum 
with philosophical cartoons and have the same source. All of us could be said to 
have various cartoon views of life when young and only a few ever grow out of 
them. 
 
Also note that, as W remarked long ago, the prefix “meta” is unnecessary and 
confusing in most (maybe all) contexts, so for ‘metacognition’ in this book, 
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substitute ‘cognition’ or ‘thinking’, since thinking about what we or others believe 
or know is thinking like any other and does not have to be seen as ‘mindreading’ 
(UA in my terminology) either. In S’s terms, the COS are the test of what is being 
thought and they are identical for ‘it’s raining’, I believe it’s raining’, ‘I believe you 
believe it’s raining’ and ‘he believes it’s raining’ (likewise for ‘knows’, wishes, 
judges, understands, etc.), namely that it’s raining. This is the critical fact to keep in 
mind regarding ‘metacognition’ and ‘mindreading’ of dispositions (‘propositional 
attitudes’) which C promotes. 
 
One of the responses in BBS was by Dennett (who shares most of C’s illusions), who 
seems to find these ideas quite good, except that C should eliminate the use of ‘I’ 
since it assumes the existence of a higher self (the aim being hard reduction of S2 to 
S1). Of course, the very act of writing, reading and all the language and concepts of 
anything whatsoever presuppose self, consciousness and will (as S often notes), so 
such an account would be just a cartoon of life without any value whatsoever, which 
one could probably say of most philosophical accounts of behavior. The WS 
framework has long noted that the first person point of view is not eliminable or 
reducible to a 3rd person one, but this is no problem for the cartoon view of life. 
Likewise, with the description of brain function or behavior as ‘computational’, 
‘information processing’ etc, -- all well debunked countless times by WS, Hutto, 
Read, Hacker and many others. Worst of all is the crucial but utterly unclear 
“representation”, for which I think S’s use as a condition of satisfaction (COS) of 
representing (i.e., the same form as for all dispositional nouns and their verbs) is by 
far the best. That is, the ‘representation’ of ‘I think it’s raining’ is the COS that it’s 
raining. 
 
Saddest of all is that C (like Dennett) thinks he is an expert on W, having studied 
him early in his career and decided that the private language argument is to be 
rejected as ‘behaviorism’! W famously rejected behaviorism and much of his work 
is devoted to describing why it cannot serve as a description of behavior. “Are you 
not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that 
everything except human behavior is a fiction? If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of 
a grammatical fiction.” (PI p307) And one can also point to real behaviorism in C in 
its modern ‘computationalist’ form. WS insist on the indispensability of the first 
person point of view while C apologizes to D in the BBS article for using “I” or 
“self”. This is in my view the difference between an accurate description of 
language use and the use one can imagine in a cartoon. 
 
Hutto has shown the vast gulf between W and Dennett (D) which will serve to 
characterize C as well, since I take D and C (along with the Churchland’s and many 
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others) to be on the same page. S is one of many who have deconstructed D in 
various writings,  and these can all be read in opposition to C. And let us recall that 
W sticks to examples of language in action, and once one gets the point he is mostly 
very easy to follow, while C is captivatedby ‘theorizing’ (i.e., chaining numerous 
sentences with no clear COS) and rarely bothers with specific language games, 
preferring experiments and observations that are quite difficult to interpret in any 
definitive way (see the BBS responses), and which in any case have no relevance to 
higher level descriptions of behavior (e.g., exactly how do they fit into the 
Intentionality Table). One book C praises as definitive (Memory and the 
Computational Brain) presents the brain as a computational information 
processor—a sophomoric view thoroughly and repeatedly annihilated by S and 
others. In the last decade, I have read thousands of pages by and about W and it is 
quite clear that C does not have a clue. In this he joins a long line of distinguished 
philosophers and scientists whose reading of W was fruitless—Russell, Quine, 
Godel, Kreisel, Chomsky, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Putnam etc. (though Putnam 
began to see the light later). They just cannot see that most philosophy is 
grammatical jokes and impossible vignettes—a cartoon view oflife. 
 
Books like this that attempt to bridge two levels of description are really two books 
and not one. There is the description (not explanation, as W made clear) of our 
language and nonverbal behavior and then the experiments of cognitive 
psychology. “The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the 
means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem and method pass 
one another by."(W PI p232), C et al are enthralled by science and just assume that 
it is a great advance to wed metaphysics to neuroscience and experimental 
psychology, but WS and many others have shown this is a mistake. Far from 
making the description of behavior scientific and clear, it makes it incoherent. And 
it must have been by the grace of God that Locke, Kant, Hume, Nietzsche, Sartre, 
Wittgenstein, Searle et al were able to give such memorable accounts of behavior 
without any experimental science whatsoever. Of course, like politicians, 
philosophers rarely admit mistakes or shut up so this will go on and on for reasons 
W diagnosed perfectly. The bottom line has to be what is useful and what makes 
sense in our everyday life. I suggest the philosophical views of CDC (Carruthers, 
Dennett, Churchland), as opposed to those of WS, are not useful and their ultimate 
conclusions that will, self and consciousness are illusions make no sense at all—i.e., 
they are meaningless having no clear COS. Whether the CDC comments on 
cognitive science have any heuristic value remains to be determined. 
 
This book (like a huge body of other writing) tries to discount the HOT of other 
animals and to reduce behavior to brain functions (to absorb psychology into 
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physiology). The philosophy is a disaster but, provided one first reads the many 
criticisms in the BBS, the commentary on recent psychology and physiology may be 
of interest. Like Dennett, Churchland and so many others often do, C does not 
reveal his real gems til the very end, when we are told that self, will, consciousness 
(in the senses in which these words normally function) are illusions (supposedly in 
the normal sense of this word). Dennett had to be unmasked by S, Hutto et al for 
explaining away these ‘superstitions’ (i.e., not explaining at all and in fact not even 
describing), but amazingly C also admits it at the beginning, though of course he 
thinks he is showing us these words do not mean what we think and that his cartoon 
use is the valid one. 
 
One should also see Hacker’s criticisms of cog sci with replies by S and Dennett in 
"Neuroscience and Philosophy” and well explored in Hacker’s books "Human 
Nature"(3 volumes) and "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" (see my 
reviews of HN V1). It is remarkable that virtually nobody in all the behavioral 
disciplines (in which I include literature, history, politics, religion, law, art etc as 
well as the obvious ones) ever states either their logical framework or what it is that 
they are trying to accomplish and what role language analysis and science play, so 
all those interested in behavior might consider memorizing Hacker’s lovely 
summary of what philosophy (DPHOT) aims to do and how this relates to scientific 
pursuits. 
 
"Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief and a 
further condition ..., or whether knowledge does not even imply belief ... We want 
to know when knowledge does and when it does not require justification. We need 
to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said that he knows something. Is 
it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a performance, a disposition or an 
ability? Could knowing or believing that p be identical with a state of the brain? 
Why can one say ` he believes that p, but it is not the case that p', whereas one cannot 
say `I believe that p, but it is not the case that p'? Why are there ways, methods and 
means of achieving, attaining or receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to 
faith)? Why can one know, but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and 
how? Why can one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, 
foolishly, thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can one 
know, but not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? And so on 
- through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only to knowledge 
and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, forgetting, observing, 
noticing, recognising, attending, being aware of, being conscious of, not to mention 
the numerous verbs of perception and their cognates. What needs to be clarified if 
these questions are to be answered is the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways 
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in which the various concepts hang together, the various forms of their 
compatibilities and incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their 
presuppositions and different forms of context dependency. To this venerable 
exercise in connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and 
self-styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever." (Passing by the 
naturalistic turn: on Quine's cul-de-sac- p15-2005). Of course, I would add that it is 
the study of our evolved psychology, of DPHOT, and the contextual sensitivity of 
language (W’s language games). It is not trivial to state these facts as it is quite rare 
to find anyone who grasps the big picture and even my hero’s such as Searle, Priest, 
Pinker, Read, etc. fall embarrassingly short when they try to define their 
professions. 
 
There have long been books on atomic physics and physical chemistry but there is 
no sign that the two will merge (nor is it a coherent idea), nor that chemistry will 
absorb biochemistry nor that it in turn will absorb physiology or genetics, nor that 
biology will disappear nor that it will eliminate psychology, sociology, etc. This is 
not due to the ‘youth’ of these disciplines but to the fact that they are different levels 
of description with entirely different concepts, data and explanatory mechanisms. 
But physics envy is powerful, and we just cannot resist the ‘precision’ of physics, 
math, information, and computation vs the ‘vagueness’ of higher levels. It ‘must’ be 
possible. 
 
Reductionism thrives in spite of the incomprehensibility (lack of application to our 
normal scale of space, time and life) of quantum mechanics, uncertainty, 
wave/particles, live/dead cats, quantum entanglement, and the incompleteness and 
algorithmic randomness of math (Godel/Chaitin—see my review of Yanofsky’s 
‘The Outer Limits of Reason’) and its irresistible pull tells us it is due to EP defaults. 
Again, a breath of badly needed fresh air from W: “For the crystalline purity of logic 
was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.” PI p107. And 
once again W from the Blue Book- “Philosophers constantly see the method of 
science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way 
science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the 
philosopher into complete darkness.” It is hard to resist throwing down most books 
on behavior and rereading W and S. Just jump from anything to e.g. these quotes  
from his PI 
http://topologicalmedialab.net/xinwei/classes/readings/Wittgenstein/pi_94-         
138_239-309.html. 
 
I suggest viewing the question of mind as essentially the same as all the ‘deep’ 
philosophical questions. We want to understand the ‘reality’ perceived by S1, but 
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S2 is not programmed for it. It’s all (or mostly) in the unconscious machinations of 
S1 via DNA. We don’t know but our DNA does courtesy of the death of trillions of 
organisms over some 3 billion years. So, we struggle with science and ever so slowly 
describe the mechanisms of mind (i.e., of brain), knowing that even should we 
arrive at “complete” knowledge of the brain, we would just have a description of 
what exact  neuronal pattern corresponds to seeing red or making a choice and an 
“explanation” of why it is not possible (not intelligible). 
 
It is obvious to me after reading tens of thousands of pages of philosophy that the 
attempt to do higher level descriptive psychology of this kind, where ordinary 
language morphs into special uses, both deliberately and inadvertently, is 
essentially impossible (i.e., the normal situation in philosophy and other behavioral 
disciplines). Using special jargon words (e.g., intensionality, realism etc.) does not 
work either as there are no philosophy police to enforce a narrow definition and the 
arguments on what they mean are interminable. Hacker is good but his writing so 
precious and dense it’s often painful. Searle is very good but requires some effort to 
embrace his terminology and I believe he makes a few major mistakes, while W is 
hands down the clearest and most insightful, once you grasp what he is doing, and 
nobody has ever been able to emulate him. His TLP remains the ultimate statement 
of the mechanical reductionist view of life, but he later saw his mistake and 
diagnosed and cured the ‘cartoon disease’, but few get the point and most simply 
ignore him and biology as well, and so there are tens of thousands of books and 
millions of articles and most religious and political organizations (and until recently 
most of economics) and almost all people with cartoon views of life. But the world 
is not a cartoon, so a great tragedy is being played out as the cartoon views of life 
collide with reality and universal blindness and selfishness bring about the collapse 
of civilization over the next two centuries (or less). 
 
I hesitate to recommend C’s writings to anyone, as the experienced ought to have 
about the same perspective I do, and the naïve will be wasting their time. Either 
read philosophy or cognitive science and avoid the amalgams. 
 
Among the endless books and articles available, I commend the 3 volumes on 
Human Nature edited by Carruthers (yes, the same), the 3 on Human Nature 
written by Hacker, the Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology 2nd Ed, and my 
reviews of W/S, Hutto, DMS, Hacker et al. and their original books. Finally, I 
suggest that if we accept W’s equation of language and mind and regard the 
‘mind/body problem’ as the ‘language/body problem’ it may help achieve his 
therapeutic aim. 
 
